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Recently, the rapid advance in genome sequencing technology has led to production of huge amount of
sensitive genomic data. However, a serious privacy challenge is confronted with increasing number of
genetic tests as genomic data is the ultimate source of identity for humans. Lately, privacy threats and
possible solutions regarding the undesired access to genomic data are discussed, however it is challeng-
ing to apply proposed solutions to real life problems due to the complex nature of security deﬁnitions. In
this review, we have categorized pre-existing problems and corresponding solutions in more understand-
able and convenient way. Additionally, we have also included open privacy problems coming with each
genomic data processing procedure. We believe our classiﬁcation of genome associated privacy problems
will pave the way for linking of real-life problems with previously proposed methods.
 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With the ofﬁcial completion of Human Genome Project in 2003
[1] we have been introduced to importance of genomic informa-
tion. Nowadays, whole genome sequence of complex organisms
can now be determined in a short time with use of
next-generation sequencing technologies. In recent years,
advances in genome sequencing technology have signiﬁcantly
reduced genome sequencing costs although the predictions were
on that the progress in sequencing technologies would follow
Moore’s Law. Breakthroughs in both affordability and throughput
of sequencing platforms have led sequencing technology to have
faster pace than expected and it is now possible to collect, store,
process and share genomic data. This expansion widened the use
of sequencing for variety of purposes such as personalized genomic
medicine, disease diagnosis and preventive treatment. Observing
the progress between the ﬁrst appearance of next-generation
sequencing platforms and today, it can be foretold that, in the
future big data coming out of sequencing platforms will determine
the trends in the ﬁelds of health diagnostics and will be used more
and more each upcoming year.
However, sequencing technology comes with burdens as it may
create problems greater than its beneﬁts which is commonly over-
looked. A genome enables uniquely identiﬁcation of its owner andcontains treasure of highly personal and sensitive information
which corresponds to the biological identity of an individual. At
this point, encrypting the name of genomic data owner will not
be sufﬁcient enough and identifying someone from anonymous
genomic data has already been witnessed [2,3], opening a huge
security gap for both the individual and the country.
In the literature, there are several solutions suggested for pri-
vacy and security of electronic health records based on
de-identiﬁcation and aggregation methods. However, these solu-
tions are not applicable to personal genomic data as genome itself
is a ultimate identiﬁer of an individual [4]. In the literature, there
are only few surveys on genomic privacy. Erlich and Narayanan
[5] give a general overview of genetic privacy breaching strategies
including non-cryptographic strategies. Naveed et al. [6] give a
review of state-of-the-art regarding computational protection
methods in genomic privacy and the main challenges in this ﬁeld.
Unlike the previous surveys, in this review, we have categorized
pre-existing problems and corresponding solutions in more under-
standable and convenient way. Additionally at our review, we have
also included open privacy problems coming with each genomic
data processing procedure. We believe our classiﬁcation of genome
associated privacy problems will smooth the way of linking
real-life problems with previously proposed methods.2. Genomic background
The human genome is the complete set of genetic information
of a living organism, which is composed of four different bases
(A,C,G,T). Genetic information lies encoded inside of chromosomes
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variety of functions controlling the human body all together.
Difference in the arrangement of these bases on each DNA strand
leads to uniqueness between individuals’ genetic composition.
Despite the potential of high diversity, most of the DNA
Sequence is conserved across the whole human population. Only
around %0.5 of each person’s DNA is different from the reference
genome, owing to genetic variations [7]. Most common genetic
variations in our body are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms
(SNP’s) which inform about patient’s susceptibility to several dis-
eases proven by several Genome Wide Association
Studies(GWAS). To exemplify; some mutations on BRCA genes
greatly increase risk of developing breast cancer.
The unique genetic information, i.e. DNA of a person, can be
retrieved from various sample sources; hair, skin, blood, saliva.
After sample collection, the genetic material is extracted using
DNA Extraction Kits and then sequenced using a sequencing plat-
form. Most commonly used sequencing platform is Illumina
Sequencers and output of Illumina sequencing platform is either
short/long single-end or paired-end reads, each including nucleo-
tides between 25 and 500 length from randomly partitioned gen-
ome. At this point, the term ‘‘coverage’’ is deﬁned which is the
number of times a nucleotide is read during the sequencing pro-
cess. Obtaining high coverage mainly helps users at reducing errors
and make correct decision for every base in the sequence. It also
implies the average number of reads representing a given nucleo-
tide in the mapped sequence.
Regarding the ‘‘mapping of a sequence’’, a sequencing platform
produces randomly ordered short reads. These reads are needed to
be put in the correct order using a reference sequence (assembled
by scientists) in order to further analyze genomic data of
sequenced individual. The process of aligning short reads from
whole genome to a reference genome is ‘‘sequence alignment
(mapping)’’ and as a result of this procedure, 3.2 billion letters in
the DNA sequence of an individual is mapped in computers (mostly
on servers) for further analysis. It should be noted that this map-
ping procedure requires high computing power, hence use of par-
allel computing dramatically reduces the processing time.
However at this step, one should be cautious to use insecure plat-
forms such as public clouds to run this procedure, as genomicFig. 1. Aligned Reads; at the top of the ﬁgure, numbers represents the location of the rea
coverage information. Below the coverage area, aligned reads are given using two differe
by the arrows at the end of each read. The most colored bar standing at the bottom of the
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to thprivacy of the genome owner may get easily violated. After the
mapping procedure, sequenced DNA is aligned to the reference
genome which can be visualized and to better understand the con-
cept, an aligned genome example is shown in Fig. 1, in which hg19
mapped Illumina Hiseq2500 paired-end reads are shown with IGV
tool [8,9].
Worldwide, a usual clinical procedure for whole genome
sequencing takes about 3 weeks and costs between $5000 and
$10,000 depending on the country kit prices. Procedure starts with
an individual going to one of the clinics where she can give a bio-
logical sample (e.g. blood, saliva, etc.) from which her DNA is
extracted. This biological sample is processed at sample processing
unit which may be at the same location with the clinic or may be a
different institution. After extracting the DNA from biological sam-
ple, sample processing unit sends resulting DNA to the sequencing
department which may be at the same location or located in a dif-
ferent place. Because of lower sequencing costs, it is very common
to send the collected samples abroad for sequencing. Sequencing is
achieved through Next Generation Sequencing (also named as High
Throughput Sequencing) platforms which produces digital output
from chemical input. Starting from the stage of collecting sample
from donor to the sequencing stage, DNA is in chemical form,
hence privacy protection and security is achievable using routine
physical precautions. However, after sequencing, DNA is digital-
ized and this digital data is subject to standard and detailed bioin-
formatics analysis. Thus, physical precautions are not sufﬁcient to
protect privacy and provide security as digital data can be easily
copied, modiﬁed and shared. In order to better represent the big
picture of genome sequencing and analysis process, steps are
explained on an example depicted in Figs. 2a and 2b.
Corresponding data formats, sizes and analysis steps for a
mostly-used Illumina Sequencing machine can be summarized as
follows; start point is to extract reads from image ﬁles to base call-
ing ﬁles (BCL). In fact, volume of the data to be analyzed decreases
at every step and considering whole genome sequencing, image
ﬁles take 12 TB of disk space and converting them into BCL format
(600 GB) saves signiﬁcant disk space. Soon after, BCL ﬁle is con-
verted into FASTQ format which is platform independent, standard
ﬁle format consisting of nucleotide sequences (reads) and quality
values. These FASTQ ﬁles need to map to a reference genome sods on a speciﬁc chromosome. Graphic, standing below the location bar, depicts the
nt colors in order to specify the direction of paired-end reads which is also indicated
ﬁgure represents the reference genome and each color stands for a nucleotide. (For
e web version of this article.)
Fig. 2a. Process of DNA sequencing and analysis – Part I.
Fig. 2b. Process of DNA sequencing and analysis – Part II.
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two options as data formats: although both formats offer the iden-
tical data information, one of them keeps data in binary form
therefore Binary Alignment/Map (BAM) ﬁles comprise smaller size.
To exemplify, for a whole genome sequencing, SequenceAlignment/Map (SAM) ﬁle is about 400 GB whereas BAM ﬁle for
the same data is about 175 GB. After obtaining the aligned genome
data, next step is ﬁnding variations (single nucleotide polymor-
phism, nucleotide(s) deletions, and insertions) in the sequenced
genome compared to the reference genome. In fact, all these
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ferences (e.g. skin/eye color, gender), predisposition to certain dis-
eases (e.g. breast cancer, prostate cancer), or social properties (e.g.
ancestor tracking, race) of an individual.
As shown in Fig. 2b, after sequencing and standard bioinformat-
ics process, generated genome data might be given to an individual
or an authority in several ways. Depending on the data owners
request, data can be given in a hard drive or can be uploaded to
a cloud in FASTQ, SAM, BAM, Variant Call Format (VCF) or any other
format for further bioinformatics analysis. Perhaps with the
upcoming developments in the smart-card, bioinformatics and
preventive health-care technologies, standardization of
smart-card practice in preventive health-care will be possible
and each individual will possess their own variant information
on their own smart-cards [10].
3. Privacy issues in genomic data processing
Digital genomic data is subject to several bioinformatics process
which introduce risks of private information disclosure. Sequence
alignment, querying private genomic data, and searching on a
genomic database are main bioinformatics processes which may
violate personal privacy if necessary countermeasures are not
taken. For genomic data processing, possible security problem
deﬁnitions and solutions for the corresponding problems are given
for:
1. Sequence alignment on insecure environments (e.g., public
clouds).
2. Querying on a private genomic data (e.g., inspection for pre-
disposition to a speciﬁc disease).
3. Querying securely on a private genomic data (e.g., inspection
for predisposition to a speciﬁc disease with a secret
parameters).
4. Querying on a private genomic database (e.g., research on a
database containing private genomic data).
5. Querying securely on a public database (e.g., research on a
database with secret parameters).
6. Querying securely on a private genomic database (e.g.,
research on a private genomic database with secret
parameters).
3.1. Secure DNA sequence alignment
Due to high and costly computational requirements, sequence
alignment is very likely to be outsourced, probably to public
clouds. Sending genomic data to a public cloud controlled by third
party companies and processing the data in an environment which
is publicly available to everyone may give rise to disclosure of pri-
vate genomic data. In order to prevent privacy violation, secure
sequence alignment mechanisms should be deﬁned. For a privacy
protecting sequence alignment, we may assume a scenario in
which Alice wants to make a sequence alignment for whole gen-
ome on a public cloud environment controlled by Bob. In this
model Alice trusts neither other cloud users nor the Bob. Alice also
assumes that any data processed on this infrastructure can be
obtained by an adversary. Thus during the alignment process no
valuable information about the reads itself should be revealed.
As a mechanism to protect the conﬁdentiality of the alignment
process, following terms are required:
1. Proposed scheme should not introduce a signiﬁcant compu-
tation overhead for sequence alignment. It is quite normal to
expect some increase in computation resource demand as
security comes at a price but this increase should be afford-
able and acceptable.2. Pre and post processing (e.g. encrypting reads, decrypting
results . . .) are likely to be done locally. Therefore, these pro-
cesses should take acceptable time on ordinary computers.
3. Apart from exact matches, proposed mechanism should be
able to handle mismatches which can be:
(a) SNPs: Up to n SNPS (e.g. for average read length of 100 nucleo-
tides, a read, containing up to 5 SNPs can be aligned correctly).
(b) Insertions: Up to n nucleotide insertion (e.g. for average read
length of 100 nucleotides, a read, containing up to 10 nucleo-
tide insertion can be aligned correctly).
(c) Deletion: Up to n nucleotide deletion (e.g. for average read
length of 100 nucleotides, a read, containing up to 10 nucleo-
tide deletion can be aligned correctly).
3.1.1. Proposed solutions
Chen et al. [11] proposed an method that solves the problem of
secure read mapping in a scalable way. The proposed solution is
based on running the computing operations on hybrid clouds
which includes both the company’s private cloud and the public
commercial cloud. Their mapping methodology is based on the
‘‘seed-and-extend’’ [12] method. It splits read mapping into two
different tasks. The process of ﬁnding exact matching by using
the keyed hash values is carried out on the public cloud and the
process of extending exact matches to ﬁnd right alignments is car-
ried out on the private cloud. The proposed method only discloses
to keyed hash values to the public cloud. Therefore, it provides
privacy.
3.1.2. Open problems
The major disadvantage of the solution proposed by [11] in
Section 3.1.1 is the need for private cloud to carry out alignments.
Due to the high computational requirements and high volume of
data, carrying out alignment operations on third party systems is
seen as the most appropriate solution. It is still an open problem
to carry out alignment process on commercial public clouds in a
privacy-preserving and effective manner.
3.2. Query on private genomic data
The human genome contains essential and private information
about a persons biology such that a genome information includes
whether a person has a tendency towards developing a speciﬁc
kind of disease. For personalized medicine and preventive
health-care, an individual’s genome is queried against a list of
known variations which will be used while calculating susceptibil-
ity to variety of diseases like breast cancer, diabetes and Alzheimer.
Paternity and ancestry tests also queries genomic data for deter-
mining biological relationships among individuals. Overall, most
of the genetic testing types like genetic compatibility, new born
screening and pharmacogenomics fall into this category. As stated
before, the disclosure of human genome has signiﬁcant risks to
personal privacy. For example, a person, carrying a mutation on a
gene known to increase the likelihood of a particular cancer, may
be denied by the health insurance company for the coverage.
Therefore privacy preserving methods are needed for storing and
accessing genomic data.
In this problem scenario, a patient, Alice, has a digital record of
her DNA sequence and wants to take one of the genomic test stated
before. This service is provided by another party, such as doctor
Bob. Alice does not trust Bob and Bob’s computation infrastructure.
Bob wants to run query on Alice’s genomic data to ﬁnd out the
sicknesses in Alice or whether Alice has a tendency to a particular
disease. Bob queries Alice’s genome with publicly known disease
markers which are composed of short DNA sequences with muta-
tion information indicative of variety of diseases. In this scenario,
Alice worries about her privacy and she does not want to share
M. Akgün et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 56 (2015) 103–111 107her DNA proﬁle with neither Bob or the health-care provider. These
kind of disease tests may be applied over Internet or on site, thus
both on-line and off-line solutions should be provided for the
patients. One of the most promising method for solving this prob-
lem seems to be privacy preserving string search algorithms.
3.2.1. Proposed solutions
In the work of [13], a privacy protecting method based on
homomorphic encryption is proposed for genomic data. Ayday
et al. evaluate that personal genomic data is quite sensitive to be
left to individuals own and they propose to store personal genomic
data in encrypted format, in a storage and processing unit which
can be accessed by governmental institutions, non-proﬁt organiza-
tions or private companies such as cloud storage service providers.
Encrypted genomic data are processed using homomorphic
encryption and proxy re-encryption in medical tests.
Additionally, Ayday et al. [14] also proposed a system based on
homomorphic encryption to protect individual’s privacy in disease
risk tests for. Likewise [13], this work also proposes to use storage
and processing unit to store sensitive data in encrypted form and
disease risk tests are performed by authorized institutions using
homomorphic encryption technique and secure integer compari-
son. In this solution, a storage and processing unit (SPU) stores
all the SNPs (approximately 40 million) of the patient. Ayday
et al. solved the storage problem in [15] without sacriﬁcing pri-
vacy. They classify SNPs as real SNPs and potential SNPs, where
real SNPs are set of SNPs observed in the patient. SPU stores the
real SNPs instead of storing all SNPs. However, this constitutes a
problem for privacy as SPU stores positions of the real SNPs in plain
text. Ayday et al. solved this problem by storing the real SNPs along
with some redundant content from the set of potential SNPs.
3.2.2. Open problems
As proposed solutions require high computing power and stor-
age facility controlled by a third party, it is challenging to apply the
proposed solutions on real-life problems. Moreover, solutions that
do not require trusted third party will be faster and more practical.
Additionally, results of genetic tests provide general informa-
tion about SNPs which may include sensitive information. A mali-
cious party can try to beneﬁt from this information and violate the
privacy of patient. Unfortunately, current solutions use simple
policies and obfuscation methods to reduce the effect of violation.
Thus, it cannot be concluded that proposed solutions provide the
full extent protection of patient privacy. It is still an open question
whether it is possible to provide the full extent protection for the
cases where private genomic data is queried with publicly known
markers.
3.3. Private query on private genomic data
This scenario looks similar to the previous one and operation is
exactly the same. In this case, queries made against the genome
should be kept secret to protect commercial rights of the operator.
An institution or a physician may have developed a new method or
identiﬁed new variations to perform the tests given in the previous
scenario and wants to protect this method from illegal use.
In this problem scenario, a patient, Alice, has a digital record of
her DNA sequence and wants take one of the genomic tests. This
service is provided by another party, such as doctor, Bob. Alice
wants to protect her privacy and does not trust Bob and Bob’s com-
putation infrastructure. At the same time, Bob wants to keep his
query conﬁdential and does not trust neither Alice nor her device
(e.g., smart-card and ﬂash drive) containing Alice’s genomic data.
Bob wants to run query on Alice’s genomic data to perform a geno-
mic test. In this scenario, both Alice and Bob worry aboutconﬁdentiality of their data. Alice does not want to disclose her
DNA proﬁle while Bob wishes to keep his queries conﬁdential.
3.3.1. Proposed attacks
Goodrich [16] showed that privacy-preserving protocols for
genomic data may reveal signiﬁcant information. One party can
guess the private genomic data of another party using the protocol
output by repetitively querying the another party. The severity of
this attack is high because real world sized genomic data can be
revealed with only a few number of queries.
3.3.2. Proposed solutions
Variety of solutions are proposed for ‘‘private query on private
genomic data’’ problem. The ﬁrst privacy preserving sequence
comparison algorithm was proposed by Atallah et al. [17]. They
modiﬁed the edit-distance protocol such that neither of the parties
reveals anything about their private sequence to the other party.
However the proposed protocol is impractical due to its intensive
computational requirements [18]. Additionally, Szajda et al. [19]
modiﬁes distributed Smith-Waterman algorithm for privacy pre-
serving sequence comparison. However, this solution provides
weak privacy because its computation process leaks more informa-
tion than its output according to [20].
Troncoso-Pastoriza et al. [21] proposed a protocol for secure
pattern matching by evaluating automata in an oblivious manner.
The protocol is developed for privacy preserving DNA matching
and provides security in semi-honest setting. It represents DNA
matching problem in the form of regular expression. The proposed
solution creates an automaton corresponding to query sequence. It
carries out secure matching or searching by running run the
automaton on genomic data. The communication complexity is lin-
ear in the size of input alphabet and the number of states of the
ﬁnite state machine. Blanton and Aliasgari [22] introduced
improvements on Troncoso-Pastoriza et al.’s protocol [21] reducing
communicating parties work. This work proposes a secure out-
sourcing of computation protocol which uses external service pro-
vider and modiﬁed multi-party protocol.
Jha et al. [18] presents privacy protecting implementations on
genomic computations such as sequence comparisons and distance
calculations using secure two-party communication protocol. They
developed three protocols for edit distance. The ﬁrst protocol uses
Yao’s garbled circuits. The second protocol splits the circuit used in
the ﬁrst protocols into small garbled circuits and shares the result
of each small circuit between participants. The third protocol
merge the ﬁrst and second protocol in order to overcome perfor-
mance and scalability issues. The major drawback of this solution
is its inability of dealing with large scale computations [20].
Bruekers et al. [23] proposed a solution in semi-honest attacker
model for limited DNA-based operations like identity, ancestor and
paternity tests including Short Tandem Repeats(STRs). The pro-
posed solution provides protection for STR proﬁles. It is based on
homomorphic encryption and its complexity highly depends on
the number of errors to be tolerated.
Eppstein et al. [24] proposed a privacy preserving comparison
method that run on compressed genomic data. They used a
Privacy-enhanced Invertible Bloom Filter (PIBF) which is extended
version of Invertible Bloom Filter (IBF) [25]. The proposed method
matches two compressed DNA sequences by performing privacy
preserving set-difference computation where complexity is pro-
portional to the size of the set difference. The creation of
Privacy-enhanced Invertible Bloom Filter depends on the querying
scenarios. In the querying scenario in which the trusted third party
is required, homomorphic encryption is utilized.
Franz et al. [26] propose a solution which utilizes Hidden
Markov Models (HMMs) to evaluate complex queries on genomic
data in a secure way. They consider the following scenario in their
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ome and a service provider that makes a disease risk test using the
patient’s genome. The health care provider wants to know the pre-
disposition of the patient against a particular disease while pro-
tecting the patient privacy. The service provider wants to protect
its intellectual property that are used for the disease risk test.
The proposed method aims to achieve both goal by running
HMM forward algorithm with improved performance [27].
Considering human whole genome sequencing, Baldi al. [28]
proposed protocols based on private set operations technique for
personalized medicine, paternity and genetic compatibility tests.
The main aim of this work is to provide privacy protecting mecha-
nisms for individuals, who share their genomic data for getting ser-
viced in order to receive genetic test service from authorized
parties. Yet, there are two problems coming with proposed solu-
tions. Firstly, when genetic data is used for personalized medicine
purposes, a party having a speciﬁc DNA ﬁngerprint can easily learn
the sequence of another party by matching the previously obtained
ﬁngerprint. Secondly, a malicious party can learn genetic data of
other party by making additional irrelevant queries as input to
genetic compatibility test.
In order to test the real world applicability of privacy preserving
personal genomic methods De Cristofaro et al. [29] developed a
tool called GenoDroid which tests the viability of paternity, ances-
try and personalized medicine tests. They focus on the following
three methods; conditional oblivious transfer, garbled circuits
and homomorphic encryption. The proposed tool has been imple-
mented on the Android operating system. GenoDroid has some off-
line non-interactive pre-processing phases running on a desktop or
a laptop PC. Thus, it does not provide a complete mobile solution.
De Cristofaro et al. [30] also proposed a protocol for privacy pre-
serving substring-testing. The proposed solution hides the position
and size of partial substrings, since these values can leak valuable
information. They applied this protocol to the scenario of genomic
testing where one party holds a copy of his digitized genome and
the other party holds a DNA marker. The output of the protocol
is only learned by the former party and no other information is
learned by either of the parties or party.
Kerschbaum et al. [31] proposed a privacy-preserving genome
matching scheme that can mitigate Goodrich’s attack [16]. Their
solution detects similar inputs by combining secure computation
of the edit distance and fuzzy commitments. They also proposed
an efﬁcient zero-knowledge proof protocol that ensures the avoid-
ance of client detection.
3.3.3. Open problems
The proposed solutions for this problem scenario have some
problems. As we described in Section 3.3.2, some solutions have
serious privacy problems and do not provide provable security.
Almost all solutions are based on either partially or somewhat
homomorphic encryption as fully homomorphic encryption has a
long way to go before it can be efﬁcient enough to be practical
[32]. Using partially or somewhat homomorphic encryption might
be practical for some genomic applications. Nevertheless, they are
far from providing complete solution for this problem. It is open
question whether it is possible to design secure and private solu-
tion without using homomorphic encryption.
3.4. Query on private genomic database
It is assumed that, in near future, governmental institutions
such as Ministry of Health will establish genomic databases for
preventive health-care and personalized medicine purposes. It is
likely that such database will comprise additional information
about the data owner apart from genomic data such as; location,
place and date of birth, physical attributes (e.g., eye and skin color,height, and weight.), medical history, and biological relationship
with other individuals. Researchers would like to take advantage
of these genomic data by using their classiﬁcation information
(e.g. location of living, gender, age and place of birth). As it is essen-
tial to permit researchers to use such databases for scientiﬁc
advancements, database owners would allow scientists to query
the database. Using speciﬁc parameters in a query and iterating
the queries by changing the parameters, would easily result in
revealing one or more individuals identity. Thus, privacy of the
individuals, whose genomic and personal data resides in the data-
base, should be guaranteed using privacy preserving methods.
In this problem scenario, a researcher Alice want to test an
hypothesis using a genomic database. Bob, the database owner,
does not trust Alice, as she would be trying to obtain private infor-
mation from database using one or more queries. Bob also does not
trust any of his employees and does not want them to be able to
access sensitive data. As result of her query, Alice expects to
receive a meaningful result to test her hypothesis, while Bob wants
to preserve the privacy of the data-owners along with serving to
the scientiﬁc world. A solution to this problem should provide pri-
vacy protection by preventing an attacker to identify individuals
from one or combined query results.
3.4.1. Proposed solutions
Canim et al. [33] proposed to use cryptographic hardware for
secure storage, share and query of genomic data. As a
tamper-proof hardware, secure co-processors are employed for
processing genomic data owned by health organizations e.g. hospi-
tals. Data reside, in encrypted form, in data storage servers which
are assumed to be untrusted. Proposed solution only addresses
the genomic data owned by health organizations and beneﬁt from
potentially expensive tamper-proof hardware. As the authors
agree, the proposed protocol cannot provide privacy in the case
where information is extracted from the query results.
3.4.2. Open problems
Canim et al.’s solution [33] is very efﬁcient. However, the size of
query is limited to the size of tamper-evident hardware’s memory.
Therefore, this solution needs some improvements in order to
accommodate larger queries.
3.5. Private query on a public genomic database
Scientists draw upon variety of public databases containing
information about health-care data, protein structure and gene
ontology. Sometimes these researchers do not want to reveal test
parameters or even the idea behind their hypotheses. As an exam-
ple think of a scientist from academia and a researcher at pharma-
ceutical company who are conducting research on same databases
and on same topics. Both would like to keep their studies conﬁden-
tial from each other before publishing or patenting their ﬁndings
due to competing ﬁnancial interests. As a result it is critical protect
the rights of query-owners in order to avoid plagiarism.
3.5.1. Proposed solutions
Up to authors’ best knowledge, there is not any proposed solu-
tion speciﬁcally aimed to solve this type of problem. Nevertheless,
this problem may be considered as a sub-problem of ‘‘Private
Query on Private Genomic Data’’ and therefore provided solutions
for the latter problem may be directly applied to this problem.
3.6. Private query on private genomic database
In a similar way with the previous problem, researchers may
want to use databases containing private genomic data to conduct
a research. In this case, the querier desires to protect her academic
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which can be easily deducted from database queries. For this case,
the database operator is obliged to protect privacy of the genomic
data owners as (probably) enforced by the law. Therefore along
with the conﬁdentiality of queries, any private information resid-
ing in the database should be protected as well.
In this scenario, a scientist Alice working in a university aims to
study an illness caused by genetic disorder using a private genomic
database operated by Bob. Alice does not trust Bob and would like
to conceal the hypothesis represented in the database query. At the
same time, Bob does not trust Alice and want to protect privacy of
individuals whose sensitive genomic data reside in the database.
Thus, a proposed solution should provide mechanisms to protect
not only the conﬁdentiality of queries and their results but also
the privacy of genomic data owners.
3.6.1. Proposed solutions
A large part of the human genome is identical among
human-kind and regions which are unique to a single individual
is relatively small. Based on this information, Wang et al. [20] pro-
posed a computation method that separates sensitive parts of a
genomic data. They consider the problem of comparing a query
sequence from a reference genome with its homologous gene
sequences from all genomes in a personal genome database. They
proposed a framework in which a computation task is distributed
between Data Provider (DP) and Data Consumer (DC). DP performs
calculations on sensitive parts of the genomewhile DCworks on the
rest. Thereby, sensitive information such as SNPs which can be used
to identify individuals are not disclosed to DC.
Ignatenko and Petkovic [34] proposed a solution for searching
and matching DNA sequence in a private DNA database. The pro-
posed solution represents DNA sequences as context trees that are
used as index information for privacy-preserving matching and
similarity searching. The context trees are built using the universal
compression technique called context-tree weighting (CTW) [35].
3.6.2. Open problems
The major problem of Wang et al.’s solution [20] is determining
sensitive and non-sensitive parts of genomic data. Some
non-sensitive parts of genomic data may be considered sensitive
in the future. Furthermore, some parts of sensitive genomic data
are public information and they may be used by an attacker in
order to retrieve other sensitive parts.
3.7. Privacy-preserving data sharing for genome-wide association
studies
Genome-wide association study (GWAS), also known as whole
genome association study (WGAS) determines associations
between common genetic variations and speciﬁc traits. It produces
aggregate statistics by examining single nucleotide polymor-
phisms (SNPs) from thousands of individuals. Aggregate statistics
are used to ﬁnd associations between a SNP and a disease [36].
3.7.1. Proposed attacks
For many years, the sharing of aggregate statistics has not been
seen as a threat for the participant’s privacy, because they are col-
lected from many individuals. Homer et al. [37] presented a frame-
work for accurately and robustly detecting the presence of an
individual with known genotype in a complex DNA mixture.
They measure the distance of the individual from a reference and
a test population. Moreover, they construct a t-test using these dis-
tance metrics and identify the previously unknown individuals.
Several subsequent studies [38–40] tried to make improvements
on the statistical power of Homer et al.’s method. Sankaraman
et al. [38] presented an upper bound on the power of detection.The researchers can be use Sankaraman et al.’s results as a guide-
line to make a limited number of SNPs available publicly without
compromising privacy.
Homer et al.’s attack requires large set of statistics in order to
detect individuals. Wang et al. [41] show that individuals can be
detected from small set of statistics. They proposed two attacks.
The ﬁrst one can be detect an individual from a couple of hundreds
of statistics by using the correlations among different SNPs. The
second one can disclose the identity of hundreds of participants.
Zhou et al. [42] tested identiﬁcation attack and recovery attack
on different data sets. They found that it is very difﬁcult to extract
signiﬁcant information from these data sets. Cai et al. [43] proposed
the ﬁrst practical attack that can detect speciﬁc individuals for
GWAS data. They also point out that the number of detected indi-
viduals increases, as the number of published genotype increases.
3.7.2. Proposed solutions
In the literature, there are studies that use differential privacy
methodology [44] in order to protect the privacy of individuals.
These studies utilize differential privacy by adding random noise
to aggregate statistics.
Uhler et al. [45] proposed a privacy preserving method for the
release of GWAS data. They utilized the differential privacy for
the release of aggregate minor allele frequencies and the release
of differentially-private statistics without compromising an indi-
vidual’s privacy.
Johnson and Shmatikov [46] proposed an algorithmic frame-
work for GWAS data. Their algorithms performs privacy preserving
computation of the number and location of SNPs that are signiﬁ-
cantly associated with the disease, p-values for any statistical test
between a given SNP and the disease, the block structure of corre-
lations, any measure of correlation between SNPs. They perform
these privacy preserving computations by injecting random noise
into the statistics.
Yu et al. [36] extended Uhler et al.’ method [45] by considering
release of differentially-private statistics by allowing for arbitrary
number of cases and controls. They also consider the situation
where data for the cases or the controls are known to the attacker.
Yu and Ji [47] presented a new explication of
differentially-private statistics that helps to conceptualize the
Hamming distance score. They also proposed a new method for
ﬁnding the hamming distance score with sensitivity 1.
Jiang et al. [48] show that the use of current perturbation tech-
nique is unlikely for the sharing of entire human genomic data.
Furthermore, their result show that the top-K most signiﬁcant
SNVs among all SNVs across the genome can be released in
privacy-preserving manner when K is small (e.g., 5–10).
Zhao et al. [49] proposed a method for data selection. The pro-
posed method helps data owner create differentially private pilot
data by leveraging the linkage disequilibrium in the human gen-
ome to preserve both the utility of the data and the privacy of
the patients. The proposed method does not offer a guarantee to
assistance in exploring disease markers. It helps researchers to
select the most useful dataset for their needs.
3.7.3. Open problems
The above studies are impractical because they needs a large
amount of noise in order to satisfy the differential privacy for a
small number of SNPs [5]. It is an open question whether there is
a data sharing method that needs smaller amounts of noise on
GWAS data in order to satisfy differential privacy.
3.8. Unclassiﬁed solutions
Ayday et al. [50] proposed a method in which researchers can
observe aligned raw genomic data of patients without breaking
110 M. Akgün et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 56 (2015) 103–111privacy. Despite available variant calling algorithms researchers
should investigate real DNA reads before determining the variants
on patient’s genome, as sequencing platforms can make reading
errors and reliability of the variant calling algorithms is still dis-
cussed. In the proposed solution, short reads are encrypted by cer-
tiﬁcated institution which performs sequencing and stores the data
at the biobank. The main purpose of the proposed system is trans-
mission of short reads in a certain range to the medical unit with-
out revealing the details of the biobank. Furthermore, this system
prevents medical unit from obtaining some particular parts of
required short reads by masking encrypted short reads. However,
this solution has some privacy problems. As a threat to proposed
solution, a malicious employee can access the medical unit’s data-
base and give an additional access rights to request owners. As a
result, whole genome information can easily be covered by several
iterative queries. Furthermore, the masking and key manager can
learn the locations of important insertions and deletions that give
critical information about patient’s health.
The personal health record system, PING, is designed to store
personal genomic data securely and efﬁciently [51]. The proposed
system also supports the secure and private sharing of genomic
data. The authors suggested use of secure array mechanism that
allows individual storage and efﬁcient access to each individual
item. They try to safeguard a certain level of privacy for genomic
data by using policy ﬁles, where users can determine which parts
of their genomic data are accessible. As a problem to this solution,
a person or institution that calculates the disease risk have free
access to disease-associated genomic data, which may be a victim
of privacy violation.
4. Conclusion
Every year sequencing and bioinformatics are becoming more
important with increasing number of genetic tests such as; pater-
nity, non-invasive prenatal diagnosis, new-born screening, allergy
and disease tendency tests. Individuals are sequenced for variety
of reasons and undesired access to these sensible genomic infor-
mation may cause serious privacy violations in the future.
Despite the breakthroughs in medicine and health sciences
reached by the use of sequencing technology, lack of privacy pre-
serving methods may create problems greater than its beneﬁts.
In order to ease and summarize the corresponding problems com-
ing with privacy leak in genomic data, we have classiﬁed existing
security problems and solutions in a more convenient and under-
standable way. Moreover we have also included the open problems
belonging to each category we deﬁned.
In the upcoming years, with advances in genome sequencing
technology privacy of sensitive genomic data will become all the
more vital given the fast growing volume of available genetic tests.
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Appendix A. Technical glossary
 De-identiﬁcation: This is the process of removing identity
information from a data set, to prevent inference of a per-
son’s identity. De-identiﬁcation is widely used in medical
research where medical statistics of patients are collected
and shared for research purposes.
 Homomorphic encryption: This is an encryption scheme
where computations can be made on cipher-text (encrypted
plain-text) and decryption of resulting cipher-text would be
equal to result of computations made on the plain-text.Homomorphic encryption schemes show great promise of
use in cloud computing environments as homomorphic
encryption enables applying operations on encrypted
information.
 Provable security: This type of security usually refers to
mathematical proofs and provable security deﬁnitions.
Overall, it is used for any type of proven security which
depends on attacker’s abilities.
 Differential privacy: Differential privacy, previously
denoted as indistinguishability, deﬁnes the notion of privacy
in statistical databases, where sensitive information like
medical records reside. These databases employing privacy
preserving methods, make statistical data available to public
domain by removing any sensitive information related to the
users.
 Keyed hashes: A hash function is a one way mechanism to
calculate a ﬁxed length message digest from variable length
input messages. It is practically infeasible to ﬁnd two mes-
sages whose digests are same. Hash functions are publicly
available and anyone who knows a message, can compute
its digest. A keyed hash mechanism improves the normal
hash procedure and introduces secret key usage in message
digest calculation process. Therefore, only that secret key
holders are allowed to compute keyed hash of a message.
 Yao’s garbled circuit: This is a speciﬁc type of a secure
multi-party computation which provides methods for multi-
ple participants to compute a function f without revealing
information about the inputs to each other. Yao’s garbled cir-
cuit is a two party protocol.
 Zero-knowledge proof protocol: This is a method for prov-
ing a statement, on which no information is disclosed except
the information about correctness of the statement.References
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